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BACKGROUND:   Beginning in the 1970s, the
government of Zambia (GRZ) and donors
invested heavily in creating an enabling
environment for the expansion of smallholder
maize production, including the development of
improved maize varieties and the provision of
seed, fertilizer, credit and marketing services.
These policies had both production and political
objectives.  They aimed at (1) increasing
domestic maize production in order to supply
Lusaka and the mining belt with cheap maize
meal; (2) reducing reliance on the European RESULTS: Adoption of the new improved
commercial farmers; and (3) improving rural Zambian maize  varieties  by  small  and  medium-
equity and incomes by increasing the market scale  farmers  was  rapid  and  extensive  following
involvement of farmers in more remote, less their introduction in 1984-88.  By 1992, 60
agriculturally  advanced  provinces,  especially percent of small/medium farm maize area was
those  who  were  key  political  supporters. planted to Zambian improved varieties.  In
OBJECTIVES: This study examines the impact
of investments by GRZ and international
agencies that led to the development and adoption
of ten improved maize varieties.  Maize
investment impact was assessed from three
levels.  First, results from an adoption survey of
farmers in all major maize growing areas were
used to calculate a rate of return (ROR).
Because farmer adoption was  influenced not
only by research but also by non-research
complementary investments in seed, extension,
and marketing, these costs were included in the
ROR calculation.  Second, numerical simulation
was used to estimate the effect on the ROR and
other indicators assuming that key marketing and
price policies had not been in place.  Third, the
study examined the historical interplay of
institutional and organizational factors that led to
the initial choice of maize policies and affected
their fiscal sustainability.  
Eastern and Southern Africa, only Kenya and
Zimbabwe have higher adoption rates.
The GRZ subsidized the establishment of input
and maize marketing services to smallholders
throughout the country, and implemented pan-
territorial pricing policies that favored
smallholders in remote areas over large
commercial farmers and others close to the
railway line. These investments had a striking
impact on smallholder adopters. Of smallholders 
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who adopted improved maize, 88 percent had maize area and production, and a retraction of
used  fertilizer  in  at  least  one  season,  and improved maize to areas closer to the railway line
application rates on maize were the second and  major  transportation  arteries.
highest in Africa in the late 1980s.  Over 60
percent of total maize production was marketed Efforts to increase the marketable surplus of
through official marketing channels until the remote smallholders suffered from three major
early 1990s.  Maize bought by official marketing flaws.  First, the exclusive focus on maize, and
organizations  was  resold  to  parastatal  milling the pan-territorial pricing structure for maize and
companies  in  urban  areas,  where  it  was maize inputs, facilitated a shift in the geographic
processed into maize flour to be sold at pattern  of  maize  production  that  was
subsidized prices to urban consumers.   uneconomic.  Second, the maize policies, and the
IMPACT OF POLICIES: An investment is
considered profitable if the ROR equals or
exceeds the opportunity cost of capital (in
Southern Africa, this is frequently assumed to be
10 percent). In spite of the widespread adoption
of improved maize, the ROR to the package of
maize investments was negative for  the 1978-91
period.  Marketing costs were pivotal: when these
were excluded, the ROR exceeded 100 percent.  
Numerical simulation was used to project what
might have happened to production, technology
adoption, distribution of benefits, and the ROR in
the absence of maize price controls and
marketing subsidies, for a representative year.
The results showed that the main impact of the
price controls and marketing subsidies was to
redistribute, not increase, aggregate production.
Maize production shifted from large to small
farmers, and from areas adjacent to the line of
rail to more remote and drier regions.  In these
areas, guaranteed prices and markets for maize
accelerated production because farmers had few
if any commercial crop alternatives.  However, it
was extremely expensive to subsidize
transportation of inputs and maize between
remote areas and major consumption centers.
GRZ expenditures in support of maize became
unsustainable, consuming 17 percent of the total
government budget by the late 1980s.  Since
then, the implementation of structural adjustment system (CDIE).
programs which liberalized marketing and
financial services  has contributed to a decline in
absence of incentives for the agents implementing
the policies (the marketing board, cooperatives,
mills, lending institutions) to keep costs low, led
to inefficiencies in the marketing system and did
not facilitate an evolution toward a mixed public-
private finance and marketing structure for a
broader array of commodities.  Third, as its base
of support  contracted, President Kaunda’s party
(UNIP) banned its main political rival, making
Zambia a single-party state.  With this move,
UNIP isolated itself from groups representing
key economic interests  who might have steered
the government toward an economically, as well
as politically, sustainable path.
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